DIAIS 231 Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8

2 OCTOBER 1973

AS OF: 0500 EDT (0900Z)

Oct 2 3 35 MH 73

No Foreign Dissem No Dissem Abroad

TE





DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material

COPY

315745

DOS and DIA review(s) completed.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS PER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2)

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8

Approved For Release 2003/10/22: CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8

The Intelligence Summary is produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency to serve the needs of the Department of Defense for appropriate current intelligence. It is furnished to non-Defense Department agencies for information only. Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent preliminary views, which are subject to modification on the basis of further information and more complete analysis.

Certain items may be designated specifically for limited distribution. Others not bearing release restrictive markings may be provided to eligible recipients by authorized DOD releasing agencies and intelligence components of the USIB. The releasing authority is responsible that items so provided conform to a specific need-to-know of the recipient and are in accordance with security and disclosure regulations. DIA Instruction No. 50-4 is applicable concerning release to contractors of any item in this publication. The titles of individual articles contained herein have the same classification as the article.

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES.


It is to be seen only by United States personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

Published by the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8 TOP SECRET UMBRA

| | SUMMARY | OFFICIAL: | 1 |
|----------------|--|------------------------------------|-------------|
| | 25X1 DIA | | , |
| | L | Captain, USN Senior Duty Office | ı :r |
| CAMBODIA | Khmer Communist troops contacts south of Phnom Penlincreasing pressure on Rout | h and are | 1 |
| LATIN AMERICA | Terrorists in three major American countries may be ground. | southern Latin forced under- | 3 |
| ARGENTINA | Juan Peron's attack on Mar to increased violence. | xism may lead | 4 |
| FRANCE | French nuclear strategy has of flexible response very of NATO, but Paris continua major role for conventional protracted conflict. | close to that les to reject | 5 |
| CZECHOSLOVAKIA | | 25X1 DI | 6 4 |
| BRIEFS | Bolivia, Argentina, Peoples Republic of China Republic of Vietnam, and | , Greece, | 7-10 25X |

ENEMY EXPANDS CONTROL ON ROUTE 5



Approved For Releation 3816/22 EA-RbH8 BRA 1R002300030011-8

CAMBODIA

KHMER COMMUNIST TROOPS CONTINUE THEIR ATTACKS SOUTH OF PHNOM PENH AND ARE INCREASING PRESSURE ON ROUTE 5.

Enemy forces continue to attack government positions in the Route 2-3 corridor south of Phnom Penh. Government troops manning two small positions -- one on Route 201 and another on Route 2 to the east -- have been forced to withdraw. A third position located at the junction of Routes 201 and 3 is isolated; however, the enemy is still being held south of the Prek Thnaot River. A counterattacking government force remained in contact with the enemy all day yesterday but made no progress in reaching its objective and remains about a mile north of Route 201.

West of Phnom Penh, government troops report little progress in their efforts to re-establish security along Route 4 west of Kompong Speu. while, north of the capital on Route 5, government troops have been forced to withdraw from the two northernmost perimeter positions at Sala Lek Pram on the southern end of the enemy-controlled section of the road. The enemy now controls about seven miles (11 kilometers) of the highway, and his troops are attacking within one-half mile of Sala Lek Pram's command post. Tuk Laak, at the northern end of the enemy-occupied section of Route 5 received a heavy indirect fire attack yesterday. Increased enemy pressure on both ends of the insurgent-controlled section of Route 5 indicates his intention of expanding the occupied area to the maximum extent possible in the face of no viable government opposition.

(Continued)

Approved For Release P008 P012 P1A-B1M88 R0A171R002300030011-8

At Kompong Cham, friendly forces are continuing to extend the government-controlled area despite minor Khmer Communist attacks by fire and ground probes. Government operations resulted in an expansion of the city's defensive perimeter by 400 meters to the north and 700 meters to the southwest yesterday. (SECRET XGDS-2)

PREPARED BY: Southeast Asia Division (DI-6) SOURCES: DAO Phnom Penh DAMSREP 011130Z (S) and

020241Z (C) Oct 73 LATEST INFO: 0200 EDT 2 Oct 73

LATIN AMERICA

TERRORISTS IN THREE MAJOR SOUTHERN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES HAVE LOST THEIR ADVANTAGE AND MAY BE FACED WITH GOING UNDERGROUND AGAINST INCREASED SECURITY.

With the fall of the Allende government in Chile, Juan Peron's hardened stance against leftist elements in Argentina, and the Uruguayan Government's measures against the Tupamaros last year, the terrorist movement in southern Latin America is without a haven and lacks successful models to encourage it. Terrorists, who had hoped to reorganize and seek respite in Argentina, have probably been shocked by Peron's statements against leftists.

Bolivian insurgents had hoped to move their base from Chile to Argentina. The Tupamaros, who had a working network in Chile, had also hoped to obtain a secure base there as well. However, the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army, with whom the Tupamaros had a relationship, has been banned and will be fighting for its own existence. Similarly, the now orphaned Chilean leftists will be prevented from using Argentina as a base. Many of the groups are looking to Peru for some measure of support, but the Velasco government has noted that surrounding countries are hostile to socialists and is not likely to act as a haven for leftist movements despite the wishes of some parties within the country.

The new atmosphere may cause the leftist insurgent movement to become more fragmented. However, the groups could seek to cooperate in a united movement, but past attempts have been doomed by differing outlooks and ideologies. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM XGDS-2)

| PREPARED SOURCES: | | Western | Area | Division | (DI-5) | |
|-------------------|------|---------|------|----------|--------|---------------|
| | | | | | | ightharpoonup |
| LATEST T | NFO. | 30 Sen | 73 | | | |

25X1A 25X1

2 Oct 73

DIA Intelligence Summary

ARGENTINA

JUAN PERON'S ATTACK ON MARXISM MAY LEAD TO INCREASED VIOLENCE.

Saying that last week's assassination of labor leader Jose Rucci was "the last straw," Peron has announced a frontal attack on Argentine Marxist groups. The President-elect said that he must have total control of the situation for his inauguration on 12 October.

Although primarily directed at the Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP), which has been charged with the murder, leftist factions in the Peronist movement are also expected to be targets in the offensive. Internecine warfare between these elements may have been the cause of recent deaths in Argentina.

Sources within the army fear increased violence since the ERP and some Peronist groups are capable of fighting against government repression. Nevertheless, the military hope to remain clear of the fighting and allow the police and special government commandos to handle the job. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)

| PREPARED | BY: | Western | Area | Division | (DI-5) |
|-----------|------|----------|------|----------|--------|
| SOURCES: | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| LATEST IN | VFO: | 29 Sep 1 | 73 | | |

25X1A

FRANCE

FRENCH NUCLEAR STRATEGY HAS EVOLVED INTO ONE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE VERY CLOSE TO THAT OF NATO. HOWEVER, PARIS CONTINUES TO REJECT A MAJOR ROLE FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT AND WILL IMPLEMENT POLICY ON A NATIONAL RATHER THAN A NATO BASIS.

President Pompidou, in his 27 September press conference, pointed out that a flexible response is part of France's deterrent policy. He referred to multiple-delivery means now available -- sea-launched IRBMs, strategic bombers, and tactical nuclear weapons -- but Pompidou reportedly favors sea-launched missiles due to their relative invulnerability. Paris recently announced that a third group of nine IRBM silos will be built in southeastern France. The country also has 36 MIRAGE strategic bombers and two POLARIS-type submarines, with three more to be built. Tactical fighters are being equipped with nuclear weapons at two bases and a tactical nuclear missile is to become operational in 1974.

Another source has said that French nuclear strategy during an attack could include demonstrative use of nuclear weapons and the employment of tactical nuclear weapons to test Soviet intentions prior to the use of strategic forces. In the French view, a major European war would likely escalate rapidly to a nuclear conflict and conventional forces would have little deterrent value. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)

PREPARED BY: Western Area Division (DI-5) SOURCES: Emb Paris 5458 28 Sep 73 (S) and

5599 29 Sep 73 (U) DIA Analysis (S/NFD)

LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73

Approved For Reteast 2812/CVR2ETCIAL RATES PMA0171R002300030011-8

| | CZECHOSLOV ANIA | | | | |
|---------|---|-------------|--|--|--|
| | | DIA 25X1 | | | |
| | It is currently estimated that the Soviets may have | | | | |
| 25X1DIA | ADMs, although this has not been confirmed. If they do, they are probably in the How-25X1DIA ever the USSR would not likely give Czechoslovakia ADMs outright, but would keep them under their control until released for use by the Soviet Government. ADMs would be highly effective along the Czechoslovak-West German border due to the mountainous terrain. (TOP SECRET 25X1 | | | | |
| | PREPARED BY: Soviet-Warsaw Pact Area Division (DI-3) SOURCES: LATEST INFO: 29 Sep 73 | | | | |

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8

Approved For Releate 1203 10 22 ETA-RUMBBIR0 171 1R002300030011-8

BRIEFS

25X1DIA

Recent events may have introduced another crack in the fragile unity of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) coalition backing President Banzer. He apparently used the 23 September disclosure of a leftist antigovernment plot as an excuse to move against the potentially troublesome labor element prior to public announcement of an austerity program. The leader of the MNR, a basically labor-oriented organization, reportedly believed the government's allegations at first and promised Banzer strong backing. his later doubts resulted in only a weak statement of support. This move reportedly irritated the FSB and may have introduced a new strain in the coalition. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2) Western Area Division (DI-5) (S/NFD)

Army Chief Lt Gen Raul Carcagno's request ARGENTINA: for the dismissal of US and French Army missions has been taken under advisement by the Defense Ministry. Defense Minister Robledo said that a decision would be reached this week. The government has been describing the proposal as a sincere effort to discontinue the groups because they are no longer needed, but politics remains the most likely reason. boasted during last month's Conference of American Armies in Venezuela that the US military mission would be sent out of Argentina. The Peron government appears to be in a quandary over how to handle the request without insulting the general or damaging relations with the US. (CONFIDENTIAL GDS-31 Dec 79) Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCES:

2 Oct 73

SOURCE:

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page 7

25X1

25X1A



Two OSA-I-class large CUBA: quided-missile patrol boats were to arrive in the Havana area yesterday, doubling Cuba's inventory of this type unit. Two Soviet tugs towed them from the Baltic. The others were delivered in the same fashion in January 1972. new OSAs will be assigned to the guided-missile patrol boat flotilla at Cabanas and will probably become operational in two or three months. Cuba has 18 KOMAR-class small quidedmissile patrol boats in addition to the OSAs -- all are equipped with the SS-N-2/STYX antiship missile. Cuba report-

edly expected only four OSAs, but more may be delivered as newer classes of patrol craft take their place in the Soviet inventory and Cuba's KOMARs become unserviceable.

| Western | Area | Division | (DI-5) | |
|---------|------|----------|--------|--|
| SOURCE: | | | | |

CUBA-PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: For the fourth time since April, Cuba has harassed Chinese-controlled ships in Cuban ports. On 22 September, the departure of a Chinese-chartered freighter was delayed by an extensive search. Other incidents have involved confiscation of crew clothing and ships' stores. reason for these actions have been noted, but Havana may be demonstrating its loyalties in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Cuba has become a primary proponent of the Soviet system as evidenced by Castro's speech at the nonaligned conference last month. This latest incident may also be in reaction to a recent Chinese propaganda effort warning of the rising Soviet threat in the Caribbean through naval deployments to Cuba. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM XGDS-2)

Western Area Division (DI-5)

SOURCES:

25X1

Page 8

2 Oct 73

DIA Intelligence Summary Approved For Release 2083/40/22: CIA-RDP83/M80474 R002300030011-8

Approved For Release 2003/E02R:ECTA-RDPBBNR04171R002300030011-8



President Papadopoulos GREECE: appointed historian-politician Spyros Markezinis Prime Minister yesterday and charged him with forming a new Cabinet to be sworn in on 8 October. One source said that the present Cabinet had already resigned, but a government announcement indicated that incumbent ministers would do so on the 6th. Postponement of the resignation was publicly attributed to absence of the Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is attending the opening of the UN session. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79)

| SOURCES: | 25X1DIA |
|----------|---------|
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

2 Oct 73

25X1A

DIA Intelligence Summary

Approved For Release 2002/10/22: FIA-FDP83MA0171R002300030011-8

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: A major engagement in Military Region 3, which began on 28 September, has raged for three days on a rubber plantation 12 miles (19 kilometers) southeast of Tay Ninh City. A two-battalion government force conducting sweep operations in the area on the 28th, made contact with reported elements of the 101st NVA Regiment, Sub Region 1, and a local Some 183 enemy soldiers were reforce battalion. portedly killed, while ARVN forces suffered nine killed, 124 wounded and 297 missing. The engagement took place within the area of operation of the 101st NVA Regiment, and there is no evidence that the communists have initiated an offensive to obtain more territory. Apparently, this attack was an enemy attempt to protect what it considered to be its territory from the ARVN force moving into the area. (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM GDS-31 Dec 79)

Southeast Asia Division (DI-6)

SOURCE: DAO Saigon Telecon 0400 EDT 2 Oct 73 (C) and DIA Analysis (C/NFD)

25X1 DIA

25X1A

```
Approved F 8 F 1 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8
       DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
       OSD/DDR&E
OSD/GEN COUNSEL
       OSD/ATSD&DSD
       OSD/SATSD&DSD (2)
       OSD/SALT SUP GP
       OASD/ISA (2)
       OASD/PA
       OASD/I (3)
OASD/SA
       OASD/I&L
       OASD/COMPTROLLER
       OASD/LA
JCS/CHAIRMAN
       JCS/DIRECTOR
       JCS/SECRETARY
       JCS/CHAM STAFF GP
       JCS/J-3 (10)
       JCS/J-4
       JCS/J-5
       JCS/J-6
       JCS/DOCSA
       JCS/SAGA
       JCS/JRC
JCS/ASCAN
       ACSI/US ARMY (40)
       COMNAVINTCOM (27)
       CMC (2)
       ACNSC
       AFCS
        SSO/USAF (31)
        AFIS/INR (2)
        AFRPL
        TFWC
       ΑU
        12TH AF
       NSC (10)
CIA (115)
        STATE DEPT (29)
        NSA (14)
        NSA REP DEFENSE
        FBI (2)
        PFIAB
        WHITE HOUSE SIT RM (3)
        GMAIC
        OMB
        NASA
        US SECRET SERVICE
       NIC (7)
NPIC (5)
ANMCC
        NEACP
        CINCONAD (2)
        20TH CONAD REGION
        21ST CONAD REGION
        23D CONAD REGION
        25TH CONAD REGION
        26TH CONAD REGION
        CINCSAC (5)
        2D AF
        CINCAL
        CINCLANT (2)
        CINCREDCOM
        CINCPAC (2)
        CINCUSARPAC (2)
        CINCPACFLT
        CINCPACAF (2)
        TAC
```

MAC FTD (3) AFSC ARPA DCA DCPA

DEF NUCLEAR AGCY 3428 TTING SQ-DSIATP

DIA (79)

TOP SECRETOVED For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP83M00171R002300030011-8

No Foreign Dissem

This Document Contains Special Intelligence Material

EXCLUDED FROM GDS PER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.17 (M-2)